Dynamic Reward–Punishment Mechanisms Driving Agricultural Systems Toward Sustainability in China

Agricultural systems are complex social–ecological systems shaped by interactions among diverse stakeholders including governments, enterprises, farmers, consumers, and financial institutions. To examine policy-driven sustainability transitions, this study focuses on three principal actors—government regulatory agencies, agricultural enterprises, and farmers—whose strategic interactions critically determine transition outcomes. The aim is to drive agricultural systems toward sustainability in China. This study develops a three-party evolutionary game model involving the government, enterprises, and farmers to explore how policy-driven incentives influence sustainable development practices. The model incorporates both static and dynamic reward–punishment mechanisms, calibrated with empirical data, to examine behavioral dynamics across stakeholders. The results indicate that fluctuations in enterprise and government engagement contribute to instability in agricultural sustainability transitions. While static reward mechanisms mitigate peak fluctuations, they are insufficient to fully stabilize enterprise commitment, with actors oscillating between sustainable and conventional agricultural practices. Linear dynamic reward mechanisms offer partial stabilization but lack the capacity to maintain long-run Nash equilibrium. In contrast, nonlinear dynamic mechanisms effectively align stakeholder incentives, fostering a stable and enduring shift toward sustainable agricultural systems. This study underscores the importance of tailored dynamic strategies to build resilient agricultural systems with integrated sustainability objectives.