TY - JOUR
T1 - Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis of New-Energy Vehicle Promotion in China Based on Reward and Punishment Mechanisms
AU - Cai, Rongjiang
AU - Zhang, Tao
AU - Wang, Xi
AU - Jia, Qiaoran
AU - Zhao, Shufang
AU - Liu, Nana
AU - Wang, Xiaoguang
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2024 by the authors.
PY - 2024/9
Y1 - 2024/9
N2 - In China, new-energy vehicles are viewed as the ultimate goal for the automobile industry, given the current focus on the “dual-carbon” target. Therefore, it is important to promote the sustainable development of this new-energy market and ensure a smooth transition from fuel-driven vehicles to new-energy vehicles. This study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving vehicle enterprises, consumers, and the government. It improves the tripartite evolutionary game through the mechanisms of dynamic and static rewards and punishments, respectively, using real-world data. The results show the following. (1) A fluctuation is present in the sales of new-energy vehicles by enterprises and the active promotional behavior of the government. This fluctuation leads to instability, and the behavior is difficult to accurately predict, which is not conducive new-energy vehicles’ promotion and sales. (2) A static reward and punishment mechanism can change the fluctuation threshold or peak value. Nevertheless, the stability of the system’s strategy is not the main reason that the government has been actively promoting it for a long time. However, enterprises are still wavering between new-energy and fuel vehicles. (3) The linear dynamic reward and punishment mechanism also has its defects. Although they are considered the stability control strategy of the system, they are still not conducive to stability. (4) The nonlinear dynamic reward and punishment mechanism can help the system to achieve the ideal stabilization strategy.
AB - In China, new-energy vehicles are viewed as the ultimate goal for the automobile industry, given the current focus on the “dual-carbon” target. Therefore, it is important to promote the sustainable development of this new-energy market and ensure a smooth transition from fuel-driven vehicles to new-energy vehicles. This study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving vehicle enterprises, consumers, and the government. It improves the tripartite evolutionary game through the mechanisms of dynamic and static rewards and punishments, respectively, using real-world data. The results show the following. (1) A fluctuation is present in the sales of new-energy vehicles by enterprises and the active promotional behavior of the government. This fluctuation leads to instability, and the behavior is difficult to accurately predict, which is not conducive new-energy vehicles’ promotion and sales. (2) A static reward and punishment mechanism can change the fluctuation threshold or peak value. Nevertheless, the stability of the system’s strategy is not the main reason that the government has been actively promoting it for a long time. However, enterprises are still wavering between new-energy and fuel vehicles. (3) The linear dynamic reward and punishment mechanism also has its defects. Although they are considered the stability control strategy of the system, they are still not conducive to stability. (4) The nonlinear dynamic reward and punishment mechanism can help the system to achieve the ideal stabilization strategy.
KW - mechanisms for rewards and punishments
KW - new-energy vehicle
KW - tripartite evolutionary game
KW - willing consumers
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85205110313&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.3390/math12182900
DO - 10.3390/math12182900
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85205110313
SN - 2227-7390
VL - 12
JO - Mathematics
JF - Mathematics
IS - 18
M1 - 2900
ER -