TY - JOUR
T1 - Game-theoretic analysis of governance and corruption in China's pharmaceutical industry
AU - Wang, Xi
AU - Zhang, Tao
AU - Gong, Hanxiang
AU - Li, Jinghua
AU - Wu, Baoling
AU - Chen, Baoxin
AU - Zhao, Shufang
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
Copyright © 2024 Wang, Zhang, Gong, Li, Wu, Chen and Zhao.
PY - 2024
Y1 - 2024
N2 - Introduction: With the rapid development of China's pharmaceutical industry, issues of corruption and regulatory effectiveness have become increasingly prominent, posing critical challenges to public health safety and the industry's sustainable development. Methods: This paper adopts a bounded rationality perspective and employs a game-theoretic evolutionary approach to establish a tripartite evolutionary game model involving pharmaceutical companies, third-party auditing organizations, and health insurance regulatory agencies. It analyzes the stable strategies of the parties involved and the sensitivity of key parameters within this tripartite game system. Results: The study reveals that adherence to health insurance regulations by pharmaceutical companies, refusal of bribes by third-party auditing organizations, and the implementation of lenient regulations by health insurance agencies can form an effective governance equilibrium. This equilibrium state contributes to reducing corruption in the pharmaceutical industry, balancing the interests of all parties, and promoting healthy industry development. Discussion: Pharmaceutical companies must balance compliance costs against the risks of non-compliance benefits while maximizing profits; third-party auditing organizations need to choose between fulfilling their duties and accepting bribes, considering their economic benefits and professional reputation; health insurance regulatory agencies adjust their strategies between strict and lenient regulation to maximize social welfare. The paper suggests enhancing policy support, strengthening compliance supervision, improving audit independence, and adjusting regulatory strategies to optimize governance in the pharmaceutical industry. Additionally, the research highlights the role of collaborative efforts among the three parties in achieving sustainable governance. Furthermore, the study conducts a numerical simulation analysis to demonstrate the impact of various parameters on the evolutionary stability of the system, providing practical insights into the implementation of regulatory policies. This research offers new insights for policy formulation and governance in China's pharmaceutical sector, providing significant reference value for guiding the industry's sustainable development.
AB - Introduction: With the rapid development of China's pharmaceutical industry, issues of corruption and regulatory effectiveness have become increasingly prominent, posing critical challenges to public health safety and the industry's sustainable development. Methods: This paper adopts a bounded rationality perspective and employs a game-theoretic evolutionary approach to establish a tripartite evolutionary game model involving pharmaceutical companies, third-party auditing organizations, and health insurance regulatory agencies. It analyzes the stable strategies of the parties involved and the sensitivity of key parameters within this tripartite game system. Results: The study reveals that adherence to health insurance regulations by pharmaceutical companies, refusal of bribes by third-party auditing organizations, and the implementation of lenient regulations by health insurance agencies can form an effective governance equilibrium. This equilibrium state contributes to reducing corruption in the pharmaceutical industry, balancing the interests of all parties, and promoting healthy industry development. Discussion: Pharmaceutical companies must balance compliance costs against the risks of non-compliance benefits while maximizing profits; third-party auditing organizations need to choose between fulfilling their duties and accepting bribes, considering their economic benefits and professional reputation; health insurance regulatory agencies adjust their strategies between strict and lenient regulation to maximize social welfare. The paper suggests enhancing policy support, strengthening compliance supervision, improving audit independence, and adjusting regulatory strategies to optimize governance in the pharmaceutical industry. Additionally, the research highlights the role of collaborative efforts among the three parties in achieving sustainable governance. Furthermore, the study conducts a numerical simulation analysis to demonstrate the impact of various parameters on the evolutionary stability of the system, providing practical insights into the implementation of regulatory policies. This research offers new insights for policy formulation and governance in China's pharmaceutical sector, providing significant reference value for guiding the industry's sustainable development.
KW - corruption
KW - evolutionary game theory
KW - governance
KW - pharmaceutical industry
KW - public health safety
KW - regulatory strategies
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85202151296&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.3389/fmed.2024.1439864
DO - 10.3389/fmed.2024.1439864
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85202151296
SN - 2296-858X
VL - 11
JO - Frontiers in Medicine
JF - Frontiers in Medicine
M1 - 1439864
ER -