GDPism and Low-Carbon Development: A Quasi-Experiment from China

Drawing on a multi-task principal-agent framework and panel data from 2,069 Chinese counties (2008–2023), this study utilizes a staggered difference-in-differences (DID) approach to examine how abandoning “GDPism” in performance appraisals influences low-carbon development. The empirical results demonstrate that phasing out “GDPism” assessments significantly and persistently reduces carbon intensity. This effect is driven by a realignment of political incentives that increases promotion prospects for ecologically successful officials, which in turn facilitates green innovation and industrial upgrading through targeted environmental subsidies. Furthermore, the reform’s efficacy is conditioned by regional contexts: while amplified by complementary ecological institutions, the carbon-reduction effect is negatively moderated by financial marketization—suggesting a substitution between administrative incentives and market discipline—and constrained by infrastructure-based “carbon lock-in.” These findings highlight the pivotal role of institutional incentive restructuring in advancing the dual-carbon transition.